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This special volume of Relations. Beyond Anthropocentrism is dedicated to 
examining a problem which has recently attracted a great deal of interest. 
This is the question about the harms that nonhuman animals suffer in the 
wild due to natural causes and the reasons to aid them whenever it is fea-
sible for us to do so. This problem, although tremendously important, has 
traditionally received less attention relatively to others, such as the moral 
consideration of the nonhuman animals exploited by humans. The tide is 
changing, however, as more and more theorists start now to study it and as 
new publications addressing it appear. 
The background assumption challenged by those who work on this 
topic is the widespread belief that life in the wild is idyllic for nonhuman 
animals. It is commonly thought that, in nature, when free from any kind of 
human interference, animals enjoy happy lives, and that any problem they 
may face in that regard is actually due to human action. The truth of the 
matter, however, is at odds with this common belief. Unfortunately, reality 
is utterly unlike this idyllic picture of life in the wild. 
Animals living in nature undergo systematic harms on a daily basis. The 
ways in which this occurs are manifold. Animals are harmed by starvation 
and dehydration. They suffer from multiple diseases as well as from injuries 
caused by accident. They have to deal with harsh weather and climatic con-
ditions. They suffer many intra and interspecific aggressions – including 
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predation, parasitism and other different forms of competition. Addition-
ally, they often have to cope with great amounts of stress and other kinds 
of psychological suffering. This list could continue almost indefinitely. 
Interestingly, in fact most people are to some extent aware that this is so. 
However, the illusion cast by the idyllic view makes it difficult for them to 
realize the huge negative impact that these natural harms have in the lives 
of animals. 
Indeed the amount of suffering and premature death present in nature 
could still be glimpsed were we only to consider the tiny number of animals 
that successfully reach maturity in comparison to those who die shortly 
after coming into existence. Population dynamics shows how this figure 
is very low because of the prevalent reproductive strategy in nature, which 
consists in producing very large numbers of offspring who have very little 
chance of survival. 
In light of a situation such as this it only makes sense to ask whether 
there is anything we ought to do to remedy it. Nevertheless, it is usually 
claimed that we have no obligation to prevent or alleviate this harmful state 
of affairs. This is accepted because nature is often considered a “flat moral 
landscape”, that is, a place in the workings of which we must not intervene, 
since anything that happens there simply should be. Thus, it is said that we 
have no reason to help nonhuman animals and that, instead, they should be 
left to their own devices. 
It must be stressed, however, that this view is held, in the first place, 
because the great amount of disvalue suffered by nonhuman animals 
remains, as we mentioned, commonly unnoticed. This phenomenon has 
many causes. For instance, most people are not familiar with the basic con-
cepts of the science of ecology and, in particular, with population dynamics. 
In addition, wishful thinking may lead many of us to think that the world 
cannot be, for the majority of sentient beings, a place of utter misery. Also, 
the fact that nonhuman animals already suffer terrible harms at our hands 
may drive us to conclude that, by contrast, those who are not exploited 
by humans must lead reasonably good lives. Finally, and very importantly, 
most people have a misguided idea about which are the animals that live in 
nature. The notion of wild animals entertained in contemporary societies 
is restricted to big vertebrates, most notably some well-known mammals 
such as African elephants or lions. Yet the vast majority of animals that 
live in nature are actually invertebrates, who die in great numbers shortly 
after coming into existence. Indeed, when thinking about dying animals, it 
is adults that come to the mind of most people, rather than the young who 
perish a few hours after hatching out of their eggs, even though the latter is 
much more prevalent. All things considered, such a deeply distorted view 
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of life in the wild cannot provide a sound basis on which to examine the 
issue of animal suffering and death in nature. 
Furthermore, the claim that we should intervene in nature to improve 
the situation of nonhuman animals clashes against the environmentalist 
discourse that is so widespread today, and which defends that we should 
simply let nature alone. Those in favor of helping animals have argued that, 
in fact, interventions in nature take place all the time, and not merely for 
anthropocentric reasons, but also to further environmentalist aims. Hence 
the question at issue is not really whether we should intervene or not, but 
rather what are the aims which we should pursue by intervening. Environ-
mentalist views value entities such as ecosystems, biocenoses, species and 
landscapes and, so, by intervening in nature their purpose is to promote 
their conservation. Those who oppose speciesism and are concerned for 
the animals living in the wild argue that, on the contrary, we should care 
for the interests of sentient beings. They are the only ones who can feel suf-
fering and experience joy and, so, intervention should be aimed at helping 
them.
In fact, it can be argued that if the interests of nonhuman animals are 
morally relevant at all, it follows that the interests of animals living in the 
wild should be taken into account in our moral deliberation just as human 
interests are. Those who reject the discrimination of nonhuman animals 
have argued that the similar interests of all sentient individuals should be 
equally considered. This implies that the species they belong to should 
be regarded as morally irrelevant. Defending the contrary would be an 
instance of speciesism, the discrimination against those who do not belong 
to a certain species. Certainly, the disregard for the suffering and death 
that occurs in nature when nonhuman animals are their victims is not the 
attitude expressed towards humans in similar circumstances who need our 
help. Consequently, the refusal to consider the interests of nonhuman ani-
mals living in nature can also be considered an instance of speciesism.
It is true that in many cases it is beyond our current powers to aid non-
human animals in nature. However, there are many other cases in which it 
is perfectly feasible to assist them. Every year there is plenty of news about 
trapped animals, or animals who fall victim of natural disasters, who are 
rescued. On a more systematic level, there exist as well different initia-
tives which work to provide care to orphan wild animals, food to starving 
animals or medical assistance to injured or sick animals, among others. In 
addition, vaccination programs against different diseases that wild animals 
suffer (such as rabies or tuberculosis) have been successfully implemented 
for decades. Thus, there is still much that is in our power which we have 
not yet carried out, and even much more to research regarding how to 
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further develop these and new programs. Yet, as we previously pointed 
out, whether this is to be done or not depends on the position we actually 
endorse regarding whether we should be concerned with the harms which 
nonhuman animals suffer in the wild.
In order to address this problem, the first issue opens with an article 
by Oscar Horta, where he examines the problem of evil in nature, that is, 
whether, in nature, disvalue outweighs value. The author claims that due to 
an evolutionary process in a context of resource scarcity, disvalue is indeed 
largely prevalent in the wild. Most animals that come into existence die 
shortly after birth and lead miserable lives. This situation, he concludes, 
gives us reasons to intervene in order to reduce such disvalue. 
Continuing with this discussion, Mikel Torres sets the moral case for 
intervening in nature to aid animals. He claims that once we reject specie-
sism and assume that we have a prima facie moral obligation to alleviate 
preventable and unjustified suffering, we are thereby committed to aiding 
animals in the wild harmed by natural phenomena. This conclusion, how-
ever, has been disputed from different perspectives, in particular, from 
within environmentalism. 
In the next article, Luciano Cunha provides an answer to one of the 
main environmentalist objections to intervention on behalf of animals. 
That is, if non-sentient natural entities have intrinsic value, it seems that 
we should not intervene in nature or at least that our reasons to intervene 
are considerably weak. For example, it is often claimed that we should not 
interfere with natural processes if that threatens the value of biodiversity. 
Or alternatively, that we should promote biodiversity, even when doing so 
clashes with individual well-being. 
In her paper, Julia M. Ramil rejects this conclusion. She examines the 
concept of diversity and assesses what kind of value diversity may have, if 
any. She concludes that even conceding that diversity has some value, in 
cases where actual harms exceed future benefits, that value is overridden 
by well-being. 
The second part of the issue starts with an interview with Professor 
Jeff McMahan. Jeff McMahan belongs to a small group of ethicists who 
work with the aim of making the world a better place. This has led him 
throughout his academic career to address a variety of neglected topics 
in moral philosophy. Such is the case of wild animal suffering and inter-
vention in nature. In this interview, Professor McMahan explains how he 
became acquainted with the topic and briefly explains why he believes it 
is quite clear that if animal suffering matters, then animal suffering caused 
by natural events matters to the same extent and should thus be prevented, 
whenever possible. This is indeed the argument that he develops on his 
Animals in Need
11
Relations – 3.1 - June 2015
http://www.ledonline.it/Relations/
well know New York Times piece The Meat Eaters, where he addresses the 
suffering caused by carnivores on their prey. In the interview, McMahan 
extends his concern to other natural harms that affect animals living in the 
wild, such as disease or starvation. He also explains to us why he thinks 
environmentalist objections to benefiting animals in the wild are unsound 
and what can be done to increase awareness of this issue among philoso-
phers and the general public. 
Later, we present a debate between Stjin Bruers and Eze Paez. In his 
paper, Bruers aims at laying out an ethical principle that accounts for alleg-
edly widespread moral intuitions about the permissibility of some harmful 
natural events, most notably predation and r-selection, the reproductive 
strategy that prevails in nature. These events are to be allowed even though 
they cause great amounts of suffering to animals that live in the wild. 
Bruers presents such principle, which he calls the 3-N principle (natural-
ness, normality and necessity), as related to the intrinsic value of biodiver-
sity. It allows him to oppose intervention in the wild, even if great gains in 
terms of individual well-being could be achieved, whenever doing so would 
inflict a great loss in biodiversity. In his reply to Bruers, however, Eze Paez 
challenges this conclusion. Firstly he assesses the results of Bruers’ account 
regarding the sacrifice of both human and nonhuman interests, finding 
them highly unacceptable. Secondly, he shows that rejecting Bruers’ view 
on biodiversity has much more plausible consequences with respect to 
r-selection and the accidental killing of invertebrates.
This is followed by a report on Animal Ethics, a new organization dedi-
cated to increasing awareness of speciesism and its impact in all animals, 
including those living in the wild. Animal Ethics shares the background 
motivation of this volume by focusing its activity on providing information 
on, as well as producing academic research about, under-addressed topics 
in animal ethics, such as the one we are dealing with here. 
The issue ends with Adriano Maninno’s review of Zoopolis: a Politi-
cal Theory of Animal Rights, by Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka. As 
Maninno points out, Zoopolis has relocated the animal rights debate from 
the classic issue of the moral considerability of animals to the political dis-
cussion about our obligations towards the so called “sovereign communi-
ties” of animals living in the wild. The author argues that even though the 
main normative theses in Zoopolis are correct, it empirically underestimates 
the extent to which nature may actually work as a failed state and thus 
demand much more of us in terms of beneficial intervention. 
The second issue of the volume opens with a paper from Brian Tomasik 
about the importance of wild animal suffering. The author claims that given 
the huge amount of animals that exist in nature, all of those concerned with 
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nonhuman animals should focus their efforts on reducing the harms that 
take place in the wild. In fact, Tomasik concludes, our utmost priority 
should be to ensure that human intelligence, along with the sciences and 
technologies available in the future, will be used to prevent wild animal 
suffering, rather than to multiply it. 
The issue continues with David Pearce’s article A Welfare State for 
Elephants?. He claims that future human beings will eventually have the 
power to change life on earth. Thus, it is our moral responsibility to use 
that power to achieve a compassionate stewardship of nonhuman animal 
wild populations, whenever that becomes feasible. The article proceeds by 
examining such stewardship could work, taking elephants that live in the 
wild as a case study. It ends by disputing the rationality of the two major 
obstacles to this project. These are speciesism and the typical arguments 
from appeal to nature, employed as objections against intervening to help 
animals.
Next, Eze Paez challenges the widespread belief according to which 
the aim of preserving organisms or ecosystems can justify the infliction of 
suffering to nonhuman sentient beings, or the failure to prevent it. Paez 
explains that one way how this might be true would be if the mere exist-
ence of non-sentient entities had telic value. Nonetheless, he concludes, 
there are strong reasons to doubt that. 
In the last article of this section, Beril Sözmen offers us a relational 
account of our moral obligations towards animals living in the wild. The 
author claims that animal ethics, understood as a radical critique to anthro-
pocentrism, can greatly benefit from the non-analytic tradition, especially 
in refining the debate about our relational duties towards other animals. 
According to the author, this is particularly true regarding the question of 
intervention in nature. 
In the second part of this issue, Max Carpendale interviews Yew-
Kwang Ng about his work on evolutionary economics of animal con-
sciousness and suffering. Ng explains what welfare biology is and how 
evolutionary economics and population dynamics can help us to solve 
crucial problems when dealing with wild animal suffering. These include 
determining members of which species are sentient individuals capable of 
having a well-being of their own, ascertaining whether they enjoy positive 
or negative well-being or deciding how their well-being can be effectively 
increased, among many others. Ng also discusses the normative implica-
tions of the prevalence of wild animal suffering regarding what we have 
most reason to do. 
Subsequently, we present a debate between Professor Clare Palmer 
and Catia Faria. Drawing on her arguments in Animal Ethics in Context, 
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Palmer claims that we do not have an obligation to intervene in order to 
assist animals living in the wild since we do not normally have with those 
animals the kind of relationships that generates such obligations. Palmer 
believes that there are many cases, though, in which we should intervene. 
For example, when there has been prior human harm. Palmer’s position 
is then that intervention is permissible, but not normally required. In her 
reply, Catia Faria claims that Palmer’s account, however supportive of 
commonly shared intuitions does not seem capable of escaping three major 
problems. Firstly, it has unacceptable consequences for the human case. 
Secondly, in order to avoid the previous concern, it necessarily falls prey of 
speciesism. Finally, it assigns too high a value to relations. 
The volume ends with Daniel Dorado’s review of the literature on wild 
animal suffering and intervention in nature, ranging from Stuart Mill’s On 
Nature to the most relevant contemporary contributions to the topic.
The purpose of this volume is to address the vastly unexplored issue of 
wild animal suffering and intervention in nature, by challenging the belief 
that life in the wild is a “flat moral landscape” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 
2011). Though it is usually assumed that we have no obligations to prevent 
or reduce the natural harms that animals suffer in the wild, if nonhuman 
interests are relevant at all, it seems that the interests of wild animals should 
also be taken into account. There are a number of objections that might be 
put forward against this conclusion, though, the most relevant of which are 
discussed in detail throughout the volume. 
We believe that these two issues provide a rigorous and comprehensive 
overview of the academic discussion on the topic. In addition, we hope that 
they will contribute to raising awareness of the situation of animals living 
in the wild. Ultimately, we expect that it will stimulate further academic 
research about the moral consideration of nonhuman animals (in particu-
lar, wild animals) and the reasons to reject speciesism. 
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